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ABSTRACT 
After the Arab spring, states in the MENA-region that were enrolled in the 
popular uprisings are now entering different settings. Some have been more 
successful, and reaching all the way to democratic consolidation. Others like 
Egypt are currently experiencing severe backlashes. In this post revolution 
context, time is starting to run out for an escape out of the transitional maze. 
Tunisia is not the only country that have managed to stabilize their post revolution 
setting, but also the only country that can be said to have been promoting 
gendered agency and creating spaces for women’s empowerment during its 
transition. This study seeks explanation to the question if gender prospects in 
transitional justice initiatives are crucial in order to be successful in today’s 
democratizations. The goal is to unveil power relations through an intersectional 
view on gendered structures. Reaching over and beyond earlier approaches, this 
paper discovers how women’s agency can help democratic consolidation. It does 
so by comparing two recent cases of transitions. The conclusion is reached that 
Tunisia has created space for gender justice to get intertwined with its democratic 
transition process, while Egypt rather falls back on authoritarian principles than 
letting female emancipation through its patriarchal doors.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
How do you seal the deal with democracy? No matter how the concept of 
democracy is defined, the road to democratic consolidation after a revolution or a 
regime-change is well known for being a problematic and turbulent process. The 
leap forward is the first step, but when in transition; “nothing can be taken for 
granted until democratic principles are widely supported and entrenched in daily 
political life” (Newton & Van Deth, 2010, p. 58). The change of moving towards 
democracy is referred to as a democratic transition process (dtp). Seen from a 
perspective of time, the dtp is a crucial period when it comes to form conditions 
for its own consolidation and societal inclusion; not least women’s political 
inclusion (Paxton, 2009, p. 154). Current research acknowledges that the various 
contexts and geographical differences, makes it hard to create a generalized 
schedule for post-revolution states to follow and for researchers to analyze them 
(Newton & Van Deth, 2010, p. 54, 55). Saying that, there are still some ‘patterns’, 
which seem to be present in both failed and successful recent transitions (p. 57). 
Transitional justice initiatives are today commonly seen as being of high 
importance for example. It can be defined as: 
 
The set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by 
different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses. 
These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations 
programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms [Emphasis added] (ICTJ, 
2015a). 
 
One aspect of the quotes “various kinds of institutional reforms” that this study 
tackles is the promotion of gender prospects in transitional justice. This is 
challenging old theoretical assumptions on what makes democratic transitions 
stable or not (see e.g. Rossi & della Porta, 2009; Björkdahl & Selimovic 2013; 
and 2015). Social movements and democratization from below, like the dtp’s 
sprung out of the Arabian spring, cannot be explained entirely by old mainstream 
theories such as ‘top-down’ economic and social perspectives. Therefore, cases 
from the Arab revolutions and dtp’s in the MENA-region1, stresses the importance 
on research handling new approaches and looking at new and different angles. 
This study has a post-structuralist and comparative perspective. The goal is to 
provide an analysis on democratic transitions that reaches over and beyond the 
top-down, and bottom-up perspectives. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1	  	   Middle-­‐Eastern	  and	  Northern	  Africa	  region:	  MENA	  consists	  of	  22	  countries,	  these	  are;	  Algeria,	  Bahrain,	  Egypt,	  Iran,	  Iraq,	  
Israel,	   Jordan,	   Kuwait,	   Lebanon,	   Libya,	  Morocco,	  Oman,	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority,	  Qatar,	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   Syria,	   Sudan,	  
Tunisia,	  Turkey,	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  and	  Yemen	  (UCDP,	  2011a,	  p.	  3).	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To stress more on the relevance with broadening the current explanatory factors 
regarding Tunisia and Egypt; recent reports present arguments that political 
instability in the MENA-region, will not only have global long-term effects but 
reaching everyone in the EU-system as well (Bergenwall and Eriksson, 2014, p. 
7). I argue that feminist theory like gendered agency, has not been given enough 
space in this debate, and has been overshadowed in the overall ‘social 
movement’- discourse used when examining these two cases. Depending on the 
turns the states in the MENA-region make at transitional crossroads, women’s 
role in these new ‘democracies’ will be stipulated. With the help from combining 
the democratization- and feminist literature with an intersectional eye on women’s 
empowerment, this paper is a contribution in explaining the transitional-puzzle by 
looking at gendered agency through stages and phases of democratic transition. 
1.1 The Arab spring 
The MENA-region has effectively withstood the powerful waves of 
democratization that globally stroke the world from the 1970’s and into 2002 
(Markoff & White, 2009, p. 55-73). Democracy actually saw a decline among 
these states during this period (UCDP, 2011a, p. 1). In the first half of 2011 
however, large and popular uprisings took place from where we today can see a 
range of unequal outcomes. The protests and their escalation are known for being 
collectively referred to as “The Arab spring”. Among the most mobilized protests 
were countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen. Change, came out 
sufficiently as a result in the states of Tunisia and Egypt, while the other cases are 
locked up in intrastate and soon to be- intractable conflicts. Syria is an empirical 
example of this. Another example is Libya, who has inherited a case post the Arab 
spring where they have been unable to make any democratic progress at all. 
Answers to why the ‘Arab awakening’ took place have reached many different 
conclusions. Discussions on ‘triggering factors’ have suggested aspects such as 
“unemployment, corruption, police brutality and poverty” (ibid). The beginning of 
this regional movement is however uncontested. It started with a personal 
catastrophe when the grocery vendor Mohammed Bouazizi, a 26 year old 
Tunisian got his cart confiscated by the police. He was physically abused in public 
by a police officer, and when he tried to get his cart back he was ignored by the 
municipal office (UCDP, 2011a, p. 2) Desperate after not getting help from the 
corrupted authorities, he set himself on fire and got so badly injured that he died a 
few days later (p. 2-3). This is said to be the flash point for the popular uprising in 
Tunisia, the jasmine revolution – which quickly spilled over to Egypt, Algeria, 
Libya, Morocco, and later on to Syria and Yemen (p. 3). Although the Arab spring 
quickly reached Egypt after the uprising in Tunsia, their outcomes varies highly. It 
is an empirical puzzle.  
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2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The greatest danger in a dtp is the backsliding to authoritarian rule and political 
oppression (Tucker, 2012, p. 8). A failed transitional process can escalate critical 
tensions and promote renewed- or intractable conflicts. Empirical examples like 
Libya, have taught us that a powerful backslide usually also requires external 
actors to intervene. If we find ways to explain how to make democratic transitions 
smoother, quicker and more societal inclusive– these critical processes in the 
beginning might help the long-term phase of democratic consolidation. The 
purpose of this Bachelor thesis is therefore to explore the bigger phenomenon, 
why some post-revolution states make the transition to democracy better than 
others. 
2.1 Research question 
This paper also examines and takes on statements saying that “Tunisia is a light in 
the region” and “Egypt is backsliding in the transitional circle” (Bergenwall & 
Eriksson, 2014, p. 7). Together with Israel, Tunisia is also the only country in the 
MENA-region that ranks as fully ”free” by Freedomhouse2. What can explain that 
a state in a region without any democratic neighbors gets these statements and 
rankings? Together with previous literature on democratization and gender theory, 
I aim to answer the research-question: Why did the democratic transition process 
become strong in Tunisia, and weak in Egypt? 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2	   The	   ”Freedomhouse	   ranking”	   is	   an	   index	   produced	   by	   the	   independent	   research	   institute	   Freedomhouse	  
[freedomhouse.org/regions/middle-­‐east-­‐and-­‐north-­‐africa#.VUnMO9Ptmko]	  (accessed	  15/05/06).	  
  4 
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
When an explaining ambition is claimed, the theoretical framework needs to be 
created by theories of explaining character (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 44). I 
begin this chapter by giving a summary of the previous research done in 
explaining democratic transitions. After that I present the theories I have used to 
identify this study’s variables.  
3.1 Previous research 
In the past, explaining why some states manage to reach democratic consolidation 
or not has overruling been done by looking at social and economic aspects 
(Newton & Van Deth, 2010, p. 64). These ‘top-down’ perspectives have been 
claimed in earlier research to be the most necessary prerequisite for states in order 
to fulfill the transition (ibid). Since democratic transitions historically started to 
vary in character and geography, the framework with modernization theory were 
later on a more popular approach (Rossi & della Porta, 2009, p. 173). 
Modernization theory also recommended economic support in order to reach 
democratization, such as Marshall plans (ibid). The main problem with the early 
research on democratic consolidation was however that “the theory relies heavily 
on European experience and is too broad and general to provide us with exact 
explanations for democratization (Newton & Van Deth, 2010, p. 64). 
 
Recently, a lot of contemporary research has been made that shows a connection 
with gender prospects in transitional justice, and its effects on democratic 
transitions (see e.g. Ní Aoláin, 2012; and Valji et al, 2012). Catherine O’Rourke 
says in her research that this is a contested but valid claim that feminist researcher 
makes. A gendered approach to transitional justice is of necessity in today’s 
complex transitions (2014). Annika Björkdahl and Johanna Mannergren 
Selimovic’s research on the subject takes its background in the limited knowledge 
we have when it comes to the multifaceted ways gender and women effects how 
we do justice, and consolidating a democratic peace. By what they call 
“advancing the agenda” through conceptual dimensions for analysis, they reach a 
conclusion that “agency and spaces for agency are ignored by mainstream 
transitional justice” (p. 177). The three dimensions transformative agency, critical 
agency, and creative agency, are used in their research to map the type of agency, 
and the gendered dynamics of a peacebuilding setting (p. 169). The aim is as they 
say, to ultimately “unveil relations between gender, power and inequality (p. 169). 
Gender as a concept is also claimed by them to also construct and distribute 
agency (ibid). I have later in this study re-shaped their conceptual framework, and 
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used their three dimensions in combination with an aspect of women’s 
mobilization in my schedule for analysis. 
3.2 Gendered agency in transitional justice  
Transitional justice is “a response to systematic or widespread violations of 
human rights. It seeks recognition for victims and promotion of possibilities for 
peace, reconciliation and democracy [Emphasis added]” (ICTJ, 2009a, p. 1). The 
background and emergence of transitional justice was a response in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s, when political change in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe was on the rise (ibid). Today, transitional justice approaches to post-
conflict or post-revolution settings are widely seen as a necessity in order to move 
to consolidation of democracy. It is therefore a holistic approach including a 
variety of initiatives like gender justice.  
 
It is not only though about making “justice”, it also treats and includes institutions 
that create incentives to promote gender equality, or other institutions that 
generally helps the dtp forward. That is how this study uses the transitional justice 
perspective, by looking at gendered agency in two cases of recent democratic 
transitions. What is agency? There is a certain need to discuss the definition of 
“agency” and “agents” in it self, since it is sometimes in the social sciences 
confused to have the same meaning as an “actor” and “actions”. The earlier 
mentioned research by Björkdahl & Selimovic (2015), tackled this by 
deconstructing the concept of agency in a clear and adequate manner. Three 
aspects are important. First of all, “agency has to do with human capacity to act” 
(p. 170). Which interprets as in order to promote agency, you need to have the 
ability to perform actions. Actions are therefore in themselves not agency, but 
needs to be analyzed whether they can be categorized as such. Secondly, as 
Björkdahl & Selimovic emphasizes: “The defining component of agency is the 
‘achievement of change’ (Shepherd, 2011: 506)’” (ibid). Thirdly, women’s 
agency is constantly re-invented and re-created (p. 170). This means that in a 
larger process, such as transitional justice-institutions or dtp’s, you need to have 
different indicators for the type of agency that is promoted or present during that 
time and space. That is why the agency I look at in my initial phase of analysis is 
not the same agency I discuss in my final phase. Change or the promotion for 
change, which agency can be summarized to be all about, is different according to 
when, how and why it is needed. Just like Björkdahl and Selimovic conclude in 
their definition, “agency is not exercised in a vacuum” (p. 170). How can agency 
claim to be gendered? For this paper the definition of gendered agency can be 
concluded to be about women’s empowerment. My definition of gendered agency 
has therefore a slightly different focus than previous research that looks more at 
post-conflict rather then post-revolution contexts (e.g. Björkdahl & Selimovic, 
2013).  
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Sarah Mosedale makes this link with looking at gendered agency in this manner. 
Her theory on women’s empowerment guides “how power relations might be 
described and evaluated in a particular context” (2005, p. 243). In order to track 
changes like gendered agency she also presents the framework as looking at not 
only ”possibilities” but ”actual actions taken” (Mosedale, 2005, p. 255). If 
gendered agency should be women’s empowerment, a definition of that concept is 
also needed. Mosedale says it is about ”having access to and control over the 
means to make a living on a sustainable and long term basis, and receiving the 
material benefits of this access and control” (p. 247). What I find interesting and 
where she does conclude with previous research regarding how agency can 
distribute gender structures by it self; “women can act to challenge gender roles as 
part of any collective struggle they are involved in” (Mosedale, 2005, p. 252). The 
theory also mentions how gendered agency is a continuum that requires 
continuous action and attention. It is a long-term process rather than short-term 
goal (p. 245). If change in normative values is to take place, like women’s societal 
and political inclusion, it must come from inside a society (Mosedale, 2005, p. 
246). Mosedale’s perspective and interpretation on power here can be theoretical 
linked and concluded to have a meta-theoretical linkage to what’s called an 
intersectional view of power-relations like gendered structures (p. 249-252). 
Intersectionality motivates how gender has a constitutive role for power relations. 
It is used in order to make power-relations in the post-colonial world more 
understandable (de los Reyes & Mulinari, 2005, p. 8). Theories with intersectional 
understandings, is an instrument in order to trace the intersection of several 
factors that in different contexts reproduce current power structures, or might 
open up for agency to change them (p. 23, 24). 
 
To conclude, power should be treated as a complex, dynamic and intersected 
concept (p. 23). This post-structuralist approach is needed in order to open up to 
identify for example why actors in Egypt won’t allow gendered agency to take 
place. This is where top-down and bottom-up perspectives wont reach in. 
Intersectionality is not a theory in it self, but needs to be combined with other 
theories in order to shape clues for reflections on how power is distributed in 
important processes such as a dtp (p. 25). I have included it in order to look both 
horizontal and vertical gaps in the dtp’s. 
3.3 Democratization and social movements 
Tunisia and Egypt can be argued as examples on what is called ‘democratization 
from below’ (Rossi & della Porta, 2009, p. 177). Democratization processes 
starting from the Arab spring are results from a long and withstanding social 
mobilization, which “needs an acceleration of certain dynamics in order to occur” 
(ibid). When looking at these cases through different phases, it also needs some 
theoretical understanding on what it is we try to explain. Establishing that four 
important stages can be said to take place within a democratization that has been 
brought up by a social movement (p. 177-183). The stages are theoretical concepts 
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used in order to know what to put an elucidative emphasis on. The first stage is 
resistance, which is mobilization against the non-democratic regime. The second 
is liberalization and the upsurge of mobilization, where social movement theory 
suggests looking at who promotes the expansion of the mobilization towards 
transition, and who undermines it (p. 179). The third is the stage of transition to 
procedural democracy. This “the elimination of the reserved powers that limit 
democracy” (ibid). The fourth stage is consolidation, when the movement 
demands a substantive and inclusive democratic rule. There is also a fifth stage of 
expansion in the theory but this is not included in my phases for analysis. This is 
because the fifth stage is mostly looking at international organizations and how 
they work to campaign for democratization. I argue that the first four stages need 
specific focus before looking at that.  
3.4 Defining the variables 
The independent variable in this study is said to be gendered agency that is part of 
the policy-perspective transitional justice. I claim it has had effect on my 
dependent variable, democratic transition that has started from below. Gendered 
agency is labeled in this study like it is in previous research – with the conceptual 
dimensions: transformative, critical and creative agency (Björkdahl & Selimovic, 
2015, p. 166). I have myself added a dimension of women’s’ mobilization as 
coming before the three different types of agency. This is done since resistance is 
part of the starting phase’s theoretical focus. To these four types of gendered 
agency, I have included different theoretical power aspects to them. The type of 
power I define as gendered agency is women’s empowerment (Mosedale, 2005). 
Four models of power can be identified within the concept of empowerment 
according: Power over, power within, power to and power with (p. 250). Power 
over is defined as a zero-sum game; to give power is to loose it yourself. Power 
within means that there is a belief that agency can be pursued; basically self-
confidence that change is possible. Power to is “power which increases the 
boundaries of what is achievable for one person without necessarily tightening the 
boundaries of what is achievable for another party” (ibid). Power with is the 
power of collective action in critical periods like transitional phases. It is about 
“creating opportunities for women to spend time with other women reflecting on 
their situation recognizing the strengths they do posses and devising strategies to 
achieve positive change “(ibid). 
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The comparative approach does exactly what it says; by comparing a few cases, 
an explanation to the research question is hoped to be given (Teorell & Svensson, 
2007, p. 236). The comparative framework with few cases for analysis needs to 
fulfill certain criteria (p. 222). The cases need to be linked to a bigger population 
of cases, and there needs to be both an academic as well as an empirical relevance 
to comparing cases (ibid), this has been motivated throughout the study’s earlier 
chapters. If an explaining ambition is claimed, the comparison also needs to show 
what is called “contra factual difference” (p. 239-243). To be able to label a 
connection as causal, the cause must have taken place before the outcome in time 
(p. 245). For a comparative analysis to track what is believed to be the causal-
mechanism, the comparative framework needs to be combined with what is called 
process tracing (p. 247). Quintessentially, it means that instead of looking at 
”several tables” you conduct a ”within-cases” analysis (p. 248). Process tracing 
can therefore be concluded to be done through descriptions, divided into sections, 
so that details on a lower level than where the independent variable acts can be 
identified and included in the analyze (p. 249). It is a constant ’making the 
connection’ through observations of what the researcher finds as indicators (p. 
250).  
 
Why compare Tunisia and Egypt? There are two well-known approaches to 
strategic case selection. These are born out of John Stuart Mill’s philosophy and 
methods called method of difference and method of agreement (Teorell & 
Svensson, 2007, p. 225-230). I have used the method of difference. In order for 
the comparison to explain varied outcomes, the two cases need to be selected 
towards the background that they share similar and comparable variables, except 
for the x and y variable (p. 226). I could for example have decided to compare 
Tunisia and Libya instead, but I don't find the criteria “to match all other variables 
except x and y” to be present in Libya’s case. Tunisia and Egypt are post-colonial 
states; their democratization and social mobilization for democracy are also both 
post-revolution results from the Arab spring. I argue that the processes are linked 
closely in time and geography. I also argue that the options are very similar for 
these two states, which motivates my purpose, research question and case 
selection. Like any other method, there are pro’s and con’s that one needs to be 
mindful about. When conducting a cross-national study, some might claim “every 
country in the world is unique so comparisons are impossible” (Newton & Van 
Deth, 2010, p. 5). But this depends on what you want to compare (p. 8). I compare 
a concept that problematizes gender prospects in transitional justice. I see 
women’s empowerment as a universal right that should be present in every 
definition of democracy, and therefore I find that a comparative approach is 
highly valid. The critic on using process tracing to explain outcomes is the 
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possibility and consequence of an existing “in-between” variable. This variable in 
case it exists, acts and effects between the independent and dependent variable (p. 
261). It makes a fake connection to what the theory and analysis tries to explain. 
Process tracing alone within a chosen case doesn’t give any scientific evidence for 
the contra-factual (ibid). This is however actually solved by comparing two cases 
according to Teorell & Svensson (2007, p. 261). It is like I said up to the student 
or researcher to make this linkage by careful descriptions. The goal in this study is 
not to show on an absolute causality. The aim is to reach a conclusion to prove 
that there might be a stable linkage to what effects democratic consolidation. 
4.1 Operationalization 
In order to understand this study’s independent variable: gendered agency, a 
deconstruction was needed. I have in chapter 3 done this when “defining the 
variables”. The dependent variable varies accordingly to the methodological 
criteria, and the variations are: failed transition to democracy vs. successful 
transition to democracy. In order to do the process tracing that my comparative 
framework requires, I have used Newton & Van Deth’s recommendation on how 
to analyze democratic change (2010, p. 53-68). A dtp can be divided into sub-
processes labeled as phases (p. 57-59). I have used this division of phases as 
analytical tools together with my theoretical framework. The phases are named 
initial, emerging, advance and phase of consolidation (ibid). Included in the 
phases, my theoretical categories with “stages” from social movement theory will 
be found. My schedule for analysis shows the four types of gendered agency and 
how it includes four different power aspects. Below I present my schedule for 
analysis.  
4.2 Analytical tools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Initial'phase Emerging'phase Advance'phase Final'phase
DV Resistance Liberalization Transition Consolidation
IDV Women's5mobilization55555Power&over
Transformative5agency555
Power&within
Critical5agency55555555555555555
Power&to
Creative5agency555555555555555
Power&with
DV='Dependent5variabel5(Democratic5transition5process) IDV=5Independent5variabel5(Gendered5agency)
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Since power and gender is said to be intersectional, I have created these divisions 
with stages and phases as guidelines for comparison, and not as an absolute 
doctrine. From an empirically aspect, different types of agency might happen 
before or after one another, or even at the same time. I do however argue that the 
types of agency are carefully matched with the stages since they have in earlier 
research shown to move transitional justice processes forward in that order (e.g. 
Björkdahl & Selimovic, 2013). The most important is that some type of gendered 
agency happens before consolidation, like I said in my methodological discussion. 
4.3 Sources and demarcations 
The sources used for material are NGO reports like the one from FOI, as well as 
writings from various ones like International Crisis Group and Freedom House. I 
also use previous research on women and the Arab spring. A few articles from the 
news agency Al Jazeera are cited, but articles analyzed are overweighing of 
academic character. Regarding demarcations I am not looking at external 
interventions for e.g. economic aid. Neither do I look deeply at the countries 
current interstate relations to old colonial rules, or USA and Russia for example. 
These can also prove to affect movements who support or undermine a turn 
towards democracy. The effects of natural resources are also excluded. I have 
earlier argued why economic, or other kind of structural approaches would most 
likely prove to be insufficient in explaining these two cases’ different outcomes.  
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5 CASES 
This chapter is where I apply my analytical tools on my empirical material. I 
begin by analyzing and presenting Tunisia’s dtp, systematically followed by 
Egypt’s. Before discussing each country’s phases, I give some contextual 
background.  
5.1 Tunisia’s transition  
Tunisia can be concluded to have a history of uprisings against undemocratic 
regimes, but has been unlucky until now with the outcomes that have followed 
(UCDP, 2015a).  In terms of a gendered perspective, there are highly gendered 
differences between male and female citizens as with every society in the Arab 
world (Ben Salem, 2010, p. 1). Education has though been highly inclusive for 
both men and women. It is generally regarded as important that also the daughter 
in a family receives this (ibid). This “momentum” was driven forward after the 
revolution, and is said to have been a positive force for social change. Tunisia has 
also a better history of presenting men and women as “equal before the law” (p. 
4). In 2010, just a year before the democratization started, 27 percent of the judges 
and 31 percent of the lawyers were women for example (ibid). Even though 
gender-related discrimination certainly exists, it is an overall perception that “a 
woman’s testimony carries the same weight as a man’s before the court” (p. 4). It 
can be argued that before the initial phase was entered, Tunisia had already 
established a good foundation for gendered agency to take place. 
5.1.1 Initial phase 
The initial phase is the about the stage of resistance. On January 5 2011, 
Mohamed Bouazizi the 26 year old fruit salesmen dies from the self-inflicted 
burns he got when he set himself on fire (Al Jazeera, 2011a). Mobilization and 
uprisings had already been reported before his time of death. One powerful event 
was when the Tunisian Bar Association, had ordered a strike to be held on 
January 6 in protest against the regime (ibid). The resistance can be summarized 
to have been vast, fast and widespread all over Tunisia. Online-activism and 
social media forums like Facebook and Twitter has been said in almost every 
writing about the initial phase help do this, giving the young branch of protesters 
the nickname ‘The Facebook generation’. According to Al Jazeera it also seems 
that the uprising was highly inclusive reaching all the way down from grass-root 
level, up to the higher elite such as the country’s judicial organs. In the strike that 
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was held on January 6 there were 8,000 lawyers and judges marching for a 
political change, which is 95 per cent of the total legal force in the country (ibid). 
In regards of women’s social mobilization this was also largely done online: 
“Beyond their presence on traditional media, feminist movements have organised 
themselves online so as to make themselves heard and to be able to mobilize 
public opinion” (Zlitni & Touati, 2012, p. 46). It can be concluded that Facebook 
was a forum that wasn’t censored by the government, and therefore this was a 
highly popular forum for women to mobilize their resistance. Right after Ben 
Ali’s regime fell, women had a chance to reflect online on what may come. A post 
in a popular feminist democracy group reads:  
 
The goal is to fight for the preservation of our status in civil society, to exchange 
ideas and information that can help understand how the new democracy works, and 
to stay united to defend our interests against some movements that can be harmful to 
our rights. Actions may follow. (Quoted in: Zlitni & Touati, 2012, p. 54) 
 
This shows that gendered agency in the initial phase was highly present and had 
large influence over protesters and demonstrators. It also shows that these were 
not only discussions but like the female participant said “action may follow”. The 
quote above was posted in a Facebook group with over 8,000 active members at 
the time, both men and women (ibid). Women could organize themselves and 
reaching past the strong patriarchal power over democratic emancipation and 
mobilization. Zlitni & Touati strengthen my analysis by saying: “Facebook is a 
tool that has brought about an upheaval in the various forms of military and the 
militant’s relationship to organized structures” (p. 46). There was also a very large 
importance to bloggers here. Lina Ben Mhenni made a big contribution in 
breaking the lead for gendered agency in this phase. Her blog ‘A Tunisian Girl’ 
was banned by the regime. She risked her own life when covering state atrocities 
in the uprisings (Pedersen & Salib, 2013, p. 257). Later she was awarded several 
awards and a nomination to the Nobel Peace Prize for her contribution to 
women’s empowerment and journalistic coverage in Tunis (Pedersen & Salib, 
2013). It is however important to not reduce this female contribution to a ‘digital 
revolution’: 
 
During the whole process that lead to President Ben Ali’s fall on January 14th
 
2011, 
women participated in all the stages of the Tunisian revolution. They were very 
active in the unions, they were there during marches and demonstrations, and their 
activism was relentless on the Internet. (Zlitni & Touati, 2012, p. 51) 
 
The most important point that the material shows in this phase is that women’s 
social mobilization helped the democratization forward, and at the same time 
promoting gendered agency. It was done through various social networks and the 
establishment of a further ground for gender equality. I argue that agents managed 
to start a break down of the intersectional power over women’s role in society and 
democracy, by mobilizing and acting in new ways at a very formative moment in 
space and time. Like Mosedale’s theory on empowerment says: Women can act 
for gendered change in every movement they are in, and at times do so in 
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collaboration with men to “improve their mutual situation” (2005, p. 252). This 
was a gender challenge female agents intertwined with the resistance of the 
regime.  
5.1.2 Emerging phase 
In the emerging phase, Tunisia enters the stage of liberalization. The state now 
needs “promoters of the expansion of the transition towards procedural 
democracy” in order to move forward with their democratization (Rossi & della 
Porta, 2009, p. 179). Tunisia was in overall very effective with this, an analytical 
summary on Freedomhouse’s comprehensive assessment of democratic 
governance, called Countries at the Crossroads, 2012 shows. The summary starts 
by saying that although Tunisia have showed very positive signs on transitional 
progress; “there are no guarantees that the reforms enacted since the historic 
ouster of longtime leader Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011 will be 
consolidated” (Tucker, 2013, p. 2). Freedom house grades states in a pointing 
system3 in order to classify its civil liberties. They gave Tunisia high gains during 
this period, even highest possible in the first category showed below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Comparative Country Scores (Tucker, 2013, p. 10) 
 
Opening up space for ‘promoters for democracy’, can be traced in this phase since 
there was what Tucker says “an explosion of new political parties and civic 
organisations” (p. 2). The former oppressive power over the political sphere is in 
this phase diminished, which allowed “a wave of civil society participation” (p. 2) 
this including women’s political inclusion. In order for this to occur, some kind of 
transformative agency must have happened. According to Tucker’s essay, there 
was a fear in Tunisia at this time that Islamist political parties would seize office 
after the revolution. In order to meet this threat with their new rights getting rolled 
back, Tunisia established a gender-parity rule for candidate lists represented (p. 
3).  I argue that this opened up space for women to reach what Mosedale calls for 
the power within (2005, p. 254). Agency that acts for power within, are changes 
that give women in Tunisia the perceptions and “belief that their actions can have 
effects” (ibid), as for example engaging in the political sphere and be given a 
chance to take office. Why is this so important? Mosedale says that in order to 
advance agency, it “is generally agreed empowerment cannot be bestowed but 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
3	  	   ”Country	  ratings	  are	  based	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  1	  to	  5,	  with	  1	  representing	  the	  lowest	  and	  5	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  freedom	  	  	  
women	  have	  to	  exercise	  their	  rights”	  (Freedomhouse.org,	  2015).	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Tunisia 5.00 4.33 4.25 3.33 4.75 4.33
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must be won” (p. 256), like in free and fair elections. Although transformative 
agency might have ben carried out here to meet the influence of political Islam, I 
argue that this act was crucial for moving forward in the democratic transition. 
Tucker also concludes in her summary of the report, that in order for Tunisia to 
advance and reach consolidation, it is imperative that they keep this gendered 
agency going (p. 3) 
5.1.3 Advance phase 
In this post revolution phase, the transition process towards democracy needs 
critical agency to secure that women’s empowerment won in earlier phases sees 
results, and gets protected. This power to-aspect means for gendered agency that it 
“increases the boundaries of what is achievable” (Mosedale, 2005, p. 230). 
Critical agency that is traced in this phase is therefore ultimately about “changes 
in policies and politics” (Björkdahl & Selimovic, 2015, p. 170).  
 
Political inclusion in the transition stage, such as women’s representation is a 
good measurement for this. According to Moghadam; “Tunisian women were 
present in the four High Commissions established to run the country during the 
2011 transition period” (2014, p. 71) This also shows that the gender parity law 
and discussion on women’s political inclusion, got enforced not only in theory but 
also practically in Tunisia. For a post revolution state in the MENA-region, this is 
a big step. It shows how gendered agency in the earlier phases has had effect. It 
can also be argued that the gendered agency traced here actually stabilized 
Tunisia’s whole dtp. Since women’s movements were so strongly involved and 
mobilized in the initial phase, it also needs to have been incorporated here in order 
to come as far as a successful stage of transition. It is explained by my social 
movements-theory: “without this coalition democracy is usually not achieved 
because contending counter movements are likely to push for restoration of the 
authoritarian/totalitarian regime” (Rossi & della Porta, 2009, p. 180). This means 
that if gendered agency acting for change in Tunisia’s dtp wasn’t accepted in this 
phase, a serious throwback in the democratization should be visible, such as 
renewed conflict or uprisings. Although the democratization can be said to gotten 
stabilized here, women’s empowerment were threatened, and ”feminist groups 
remained mobilized, holding many rallies in 2011 and 2012” (Moghadam, 2014, 
p. 71). Advancing the agenda for women in Tunisia, and expanding their 
boundaries took a lot of actions upholding agency. This is exemplified when the 
“Ennahda” – Tunisia’s Muslim party, tried to back earlier progress made for 
gender equality by proposing article 28 described below:  
 
When the Ennahda members of the NCA sought to replace the term “equality” with 
words akin to “complementarity” or “partnership” in the new constitution, women’s 
rights activists and their male supporters in the secular and left-wing parties took to 
the streets in protest, forcing Ennahda to retreat. (Moghadam, 2014, p. 71-72) 
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Article 28 created massive tensions and fear for political crisis in Tunisia’s 
advance phase.  Civil society groups had to mediate between the parties in 
Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly (ibid). The fight for gendered agency 
can again be proved to have had effect in Tunisia’s dtp, since the government as a 
result had to step down and announce a re-election. Not only is this an example 
that critical agency acting for power to was present, it is also as Moghadam’s 
article says: ”demonstrating Tunisia’s political maturity” (p. 72,). during their 
stage of transition. It also shows that critical agency performed by social 
movements were able to win over actions that can be “rewarded by patriarchal 
structures” (Björkdahl & Mannergren Selimovic, 2015, p. 170). 
5.1.4 Final phase 
Democratic consolidation has a tendency to be seen in political science as a 
dichotomous concept (Rossi & della Porta, 2009, p. 181). I treat the concept as I 
do with gender, a continuum and a long-term process. Democratic consolidation 
should not only be reduced to be identified as to when country had their first and 
free elections. I argue that democratic consolidation needs just as much everyday 
attention as does promotion for gendered agency, in order for each other to 
survive in a post revolution setting. This means that in a stage of consolidation, 
the work with creative agency needs to develop women’s empowerment through a 
power with aspect. ‘Power with’ refers to collective action (Mosedale, 2005, p. 
250). By “recognizing that more can be achieved by a group” (ibid), creative 
agency “can be exercised in a manner that unsettles conventional boundaries of 
women’s agency” (Björkdahl & Selimovic, 2015, p. 171).  It is ultimately about 
acting for change “while opening up new possibilities for women’s agency” 
(ibid). The material in my final phase, now proofs just how long Tunisia has been 
able to reach compared to Egypt.  
 
In the context of the meagre harvest of the “Arab Spring”, Tunisia remains the last 
hope for a successful democratic transition. The country and its allies have every 
reason to ensure that Tunisia continues on its exceptional course. (ICG, 2014a)  
 
The same conclusion is also discussed a report from FOI. Tunisia has reached 
very far in their consolidation (Bergenwall & Eriksson, 2014, p. 18). Although 
being a “light in the region” the full results from Tunisia’s final phase cannot be 
said to be visible just yet. Several ex-regime loyalists had been allowed to ‘”make 
a political comeback”, and how this will affect Tunisia’s democratization, and 
women’s empowerment is still unknown (ibid). In general, it is now safe to say 
that the image of the Arab woman and her place in the Tunisian society has gone 
through a massive change, something several academic articles agree upon (for 
e.g. Ibnouf, 2013, p. 19). There are also examples of the creative agency I defined 
above, and of gendered agency still evolving in present Tunisia. In March 2013, 
Tunisia hosted the World Social Forum at the University of Tunis: “The 
atmosphere at the university and indeed throughout the city, where marches and 
rallies took place, was one of remarkable openness [emphasis added], with the 
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participation of feminists, secularists, communists, anarchists, and many 
foreigners of various persuasions” (Moghadam, 2014, p. 67). This is just one 
positive example on how the patriarchy’s structural power over women in Tunisia, 
seems to have decreased in range as democracy grew. Another empirical finding 
that Tunisia are now undertaking this kind of agency is identified. In October 
2014, the new parliament doesn’t only have 31 percent female share of members, 
but as much as 47 percent of the total of parliamentary candidates were female (p. 
72). 
 
5.2 Egypt’s transition  
The first mobilized demonstration that really reached international attention took 
place at The Tahrir square January 25, and is referred to as “the day of rage” 
(UCDP, 2015a, p. 1). 250 000 demonstrators both men and women, are said to 
have been present at the square, urging for the resignation of President Hosni 
Mubarak (ibid). The demonstrations were successful. After Mubarak lost power 
over the military, he left Cairo, 11 February 2011. The power was quickly 
assumed by the SCAF. Renewed demonstrations against the interim institution 
have been intense and large in scale.  
 
In regards of women’s situation, two major reforms took place in 2008. First was 
the one that women were allowed to become judges and work within the legal 
system like (Tadros, 2010, p. 2). Secondly, Egypt added amendments, which were 
crucial steps towards a future criminalization of female genital mutilation, and to 
rise the minimum age for marriage to 18 (p. 3). However, since Egypt’s judicial 
system is under high influence of Sharia-law, the two legal changes that would 
have strengthened female emancipation pre Arab spring were unfortunately re-
written during Egypt’s advance phase.  
5.2.1 Initial phase 
After “the day of rage” on January 26, like in Tunisia; legal workers such as 
lawyers stage a protest in the town of Alexandria north of Cairo (Al Jazeera, 
2011a). Although not as vast as the one in Tunisia this was considered a threat 
since social networks and phone lines were cut off this day (ibid). Basically 
making it much harder for the large mass of resistance to peacefully gather or 
organize their demonstrations. The effects from this power over action are where 
the uprising starts to differ from Tunisia. The whole stage of resistance, Internet 
was coming and going, and even traditional media claimed they had problems 
with broadcasts they had never experienced before (ibid).  
 
When it comes to tracing women’s mobilization in this phase, there are 
similarities to Tunisian agency. Esraa Abdel Fattah, an Egyptian female activist, 
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has been said to be one of the most influential protester to act for gendered agency 
and women’s mobilization before- and during the Arab spring. Like Lina Ben 
Mhenni, the famous Tunisian blogger, Esraa was also nominated in 2011 for the 
Nobel Peace Prize and got extensive international attention for her work in 
empowering women (Pedersen & Salib, 2013, p. 256). Both Lina’s and Esraa’s 
work has focused on highlighting women’s contribution in the stage of resistance: 
“They have stayed active following the overthrow of the Ben Ali and Mubarak 
regimes by creating local civil society organizations, mobilizing protesters and 
documenting government abuses” (ibid). In an interview with Esraa I find one 
statement on gendered agency and perceptions about women’s role in the initial 
phase that differs from Tunisia: 
 
At the beginning of the protests women were participating and mobilizing other to 
join in – not only activist women but also housewives and young women who were 
not previously engaged in politics. (Pedersen and Salib, 2013, p. 257) 
 
So far according to this, it resembles the uprising in Tunisia where the 
organization reached the larger population of women in different social groups. 
But she further develops how the mobilization was seen among women and what 
the goals were: 
 
They knew they were seeking dignity and freedom, not as women, but as citizens 
[emphasis added]. (ibid) 
 
In the initial phase for Tunisia, I claimed that I had traced actions in the stage of 
resistance that also worked as gendered agency; challenging old gendered roles 
and women’s political inclusion. In Tunisia I argue that women took on a double 
fight, organizing not only for democratic change, but also for women’s 
empowerment at the same time. It seems as Esraa Abdel Fattah, claims that 
women’s mobilization here was rather done on existing premises in order for them 
to be allowed to be included; or for them to actually be engaged. It is my 
interpretation that this is a high difference in the protest dynamics, and that it has 
to do with a strong intersective power over women in Egypt. My analysis also 
gets support from Moghadam’s research on the subject (2014). She says that: 
“Throughout history, we have seen women not always mobilizing as women” (p. 
60). The mobilization in Egypt during this phase was also not as powerful as the 
feminist networks in Tunisia. Feminist NGOs in Egypt created several attempts to 
collaborate, but they were “not sufficiently organized to work together 
effectively” according to Salib & Pedersen (2013, p. 260). The constant state 
interference censoring online and media broadcasts, can be one aspect to why this 
was so tough for the activists in Egypt to accomplish. I argue that gendered 
agency, and challenging gender roles wasn’t intertwined with the democratization 
in the same ways as it was with the uprising in Tunisia.  As the next phase will 
show, women’s mobilization in Egypt was however strong enough to threat the 
regimes power over the female emancipation, and there were heavy actions taken 
in order to start breaking it down. 
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5.2.2 Emerging phase 
Since this phase is about the stage of liberalization, it is of high importance that 
civil liberties here get a push, something when looking at Freedom House’s 
ranking, can be concluded were very absent. The chart below shows how Egypt 
struggled with state oppression even in this phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: (Tucker, 2012, p. 10) 
 
Why the scores differ so highly and the reason for Egypt’s low rating is said to be 
because of support that Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak still had at this time 
(Tucker, 2012, p. 3). “Key Mubarak-era institutions and practices persisted after 
the president’s fall” (ibid). Obstacles for promoters of democracy, and 
transformative agency were highly present here unlike in Tunisia: “Severe 
Mubarak-era limitations on the registration and activity of NGOs were not 
removed, despite early signs that SCAF4 would consult and include such groups 
in the policymaking process” (p. 3). This is where it can be said that Egypt started 
their severe constant backlashes in their dtp. Egypt actively made sure to block 
any kind of transformative agency by targeting out female protesters and arresting 
them. To make sure to break down women’s empowerment, the female protesters 
were sent and locked up in hospitals were they were forced to go through what the 
SCAF called “virginity checks” (p. 4). These gross violations on Egypt’s women 
were “intrusive examinations that were apparently designed to humiliate women 
into political passivity” (ibid). I conclude that this is an example on the fear that 
the patriarchal structure had for women getting space to obtain a power within. 
Gendered agency was perceived as a threat that could overthrow their control of 
the democratization.  
5.2.3 Advance phase 
In the stage of transition Egypt’s backlash to totalitarian rule escalates. Like the 
theory on social movement says, it is important in the transition process to seek 
coalitions among groups, so that “cycles of protests” doesn’t push in opposite 
directions – causing a throwback to conflict or revolution (Rossi della Porta, 2009, 
p. 180). Although Egypt managed to elect a “democratic” leader in the earlier 
phase, President Mohamed Morsi from the Muslim Brotherhood was removed by 
the military after a short rule. This created a high “polarization between 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4  SCAF;	  Egypt’s	  Supreme	  Council	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces.	  The	  SCAF	  were	  the	  largest	  inter-­‐rim	  power	  after	  the	  initial	  phase,	  
promising	  to	  treasure	  the	  people’s	  right	  for	  democratic	  change,	  evidence	  show	  however	  that	  they	  arrested	  important	  
voices	  and	  innocent	  bloggers.	  They	  blocked	  further	  mobilization	  throughout	  the	  whole	  process	  (Tucker,	  2012,	  p.	  3-­‐4). 
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supporters and opponents” (ICG, 2013a), which can only be said to have been 
highly unfavorable for the democratic process. The backlash is so severe that 
“Egypt is embarking on a transition in many ways disturbing like the one it just 
experienced” (ibid). The problem is also that when the military are taking actions 
to break down the Muslim Brotherhood, it is also undermining any form of 
gendered agency. Since women need spaces to seek collective empowerment, this 
is not possible in Egypt when according to ICG; social networks and media 
broadcasts keeps getting shut down, with the streets becoming more and more 
unsafe. The stage of transition in Egypt is highly violent. Not only compared to 
the same phase in Tunisia – but also compared to its own history: “Only this time 
around, the cost of failure could well include political violence at a level not 
experienced by Egypt since the early 1990” (p. 3). It is uncontested to say that 
Egypt’s transition is ”marching in circles” (ibid). The political atmosphere for 
activists and protesters is described as a ”winner-takes-it-all approach” (ibid). 
What does this means for women’s ability to act? When trying to trace critical 
agency in this phase, it also shows the tough landscape that women are now in. 
Critical agency like gender-favorable “changes in policies and politics” is not 
present here. Neither do I trace a power to aspect with women’s empowerment.  
To be able to increase “the boundaries of what is achievable”, in this context is 
simply too demandable for gendered agency in this phase (Mosedale, 2005, p. 
230). Esraa Abdel Fattah, Egypt’s famous feminist activists says in regards to the 
transition: “Women’s status has somehow gone backward, but we are fighting this 
by pushing ourselves forward with public participation, both politically and 
socially” (Pedersen & Salib, 2013, p. 259). In this phase it doesn’t only becomes 
clear just how threatened Egypt’s dtp is – it also becomes clear how strong 
gender-threatening agency is working to disempower Egypt’s women. This is a 
type of agency that try to “internalize hegemonic norms” in order to get 
“rewarded by patriarchal structures” (Björkdahl & Selimovic, 2015, p. 170). It is 
exemplified by this quote: 
 
Since the revolution, conservative forces have also been on the rise, demanding 
policies and particularly reforms of family legislation that would represent a step 
backward for women and deprive them of their rights. (Pedersen & Salib, 2013, p. 
260) 
 
This is highly problematic for women’s empowerment and for the democratic 
transition. This suggestion on policies and reforms did include for e.g. women’s 
right to divorce (Jerusalem Post, 2012a). To conclude it can be said that there are 
forces in Egypt working actively against women, and doing it in a way that will be 
devastating for their ability to act for change. 
5.2.4 Final phase 
It cannot be argued that Egypt has entered any stage of solid democratic 
consolidation. In the final phase, “Egypt’s military regime has reassessed control 
and are practicing oppression enforced on anyone of opposition” (Bergenwall & 
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Eriksson, 2014, p. 11). This can be concluded to build a climate of political apathy 
towards democratization. It is also highly concerning with latest build up of 
Islamic extremism in Egypt (p. 32). This only results in a dynamic where the 
current military regime tightens up their strength over Egypt’s citizens (ibid). This 
affects every aspect of human rights, not at least women’s rights, which are the 
first to get targeted when these patriarchal and powerful structures decide to 
increase in proportion. There are several examples of this: “The Coalition of 
Women’s NGOs, composed of about ten women’s groups, tried to advance a 
women’s rights agenda but failed to mobilize sufficient popular support or support 
among the new political elites” (Moghadam, 2014, p. 69). Another example that is 
how gendered agency that had made progress even before the Arab spring now 
was eliminated (ibid). The amendments that Egypt had added already in 2008, 
which could lead to further female emancipation – were erased when the 
constitution was written. The draft constitution created by Egypt’s first 
Constitutent Assembly (CA), didn’t only fall short in protecting women’s right, 
but also religious minorities and child protection: 
 
It restricted freedom of expression in the name of protecting religion; it allowed for 
the military trial of civilians; failed to protect the rights of children, especially those 
of young girls, by not defining a child as any person under age eighteen (as per the 
UN’s Convention on the Rights of the Child) to protect girls from early marriage.  
(Moghadam, 2014, p. 70) 
 
This disturbing fact shows how failed democratization also gets interlinked with 
failed gendered agency. It also shows the intersectional character of power taken 
by Egypt’s CA. Not only making sure women wouldn’t threaten the patriarchy, 
minorities and other religious groups were also stripped of judicial grants for 
protection. Like said in the previous section, for gendered agency to move 
forward or even be present in Egypt’s current context is highly challenged. No 
bigger signs of progress can be said to have taken place, instead traces of agency 
acting for further disempowering seems to have won. Some glimpses of light are 
though traced, and activists for women’s empowerment weren’t totally absent. 
After the military had overthrown Morsi’s regime, the new CA managed to elect 
five women, three who are outspoken feminists according to Moghadam (2014, p. 
70). If they will be giving space enough to act for creative agency and reaching 
power with, is hard to say. The CA only has 100 seats. The three women who say 
they are acting for gendered agency will need a lot of support in order to break 
through in the Islamist dominated assembly and their norms on women’s place in 
a democracy. 
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6 RESULTS 
In this part of the thesis I compare findings from my previous chapter. Below is an 
overview of the results from my analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Tunisia 
At the beginning of Tunisia’s dtp, my analysis show that women did engage in the 
initial phase to act on a double basis. Firstly, they wanted a change towards 
democracy. Secondly, at the same time they wanted action for women’s 
empowerment. I argue that this intertwined the uprising and later on the 
democratization with gendered agency. It did enable women’s social mobilization 
to reach over hegemonic and patriarchal structures. As a result it can be claimed 
that the democratization process and the leap for female emancipation were 
mutually beneficial of each other. Not only were men and women protesting for a 
regime change, they were also marching together for gendered agency. When the 
gender parity for candidates list got established, my analysis shows that Tunisian 
women had understood that “empowerment cannot be bestowed but must be won” 
(Mosedale, 2005, p. 256).  Another result from the analysis is that Tunisia clearly 
understood the importance of coalitions. After article 28 got presented, it was seen 
as a massive threat. Not only for the progress that had been made in gendered 
Phases Tunisia Egypt
Initial.phase
Women's(mobilization(was(vast(and(
influential.(The(gendered(agency(arose(online.(
Agents(reached(past(the(patrarchal('power(
over'(their(emancipative(values.
State(interference(with(online(activism(and(
media;((women's(mobilization(not(as(effective(
for(gendered(agency;(wasn't(intertwined(in(
the(dtp(as(it(was(in(Tunisia.
Emerging.phase
Transformative(agency(traced(by(
establishment(of(a(gender?parity(rule(for(
candidate(lists.(Enabling('power(within'.
Gross(state(violations(targeted(at(female(
protesters;(undermining(and(threatening(
transformative(agency(and('power(within'.
Advance.phase
Critical(agency(and(reaching('power(to'(was(
traced(by(social(movements(who(kept(acting(
for(protection(of(earlier(won(results(in(gender(
equality,(not(accepting(rewards(by(patriarchal(
structrues.
Severe(backlashes(in(the(dtp.(Egypt(is(
reported(to(be("marching(in(transitional(
circles".(Strong(patriarchal(and(intersected(
powers(working(against(females(and(
gendered(agency.
Final.phase
Tunisia(has(shown("politcal(maturity"(and(
allowing(spaces(for(creative(agency.('Power(
with'(is(enabled(as(women(take(a(large(
number(of(seats(in(the(democratic(institutions(
in(2014
The(military(regime(is(enforcing(renewed(
oppression.(Gendered(agency(suffers(
backlashes(in(the(CA.(Women's(empowerment(
gets(sacrificed(in(the(name(of(religious(
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agency, but for the whole new setting of a democratic rule. A re-election instead 
of trying to break down women’s empowerment led to a result of 31 percent of 
female share in the parliament. Of all the countries involved in the Arab spring, 
Tunisia is the only one that has been successful with two things: Democratic 
transition and the promotion of gender prospects in transitional justice. As my 
result-overview shows though, this was not done without obstacles or in a 
consistent linear manner. However, the will to make democratic progress instead 
of a violent backlash like Egypt, led to these coalitions among civil- and social 
groups that are so crucial for reaching consolidation.  
6.2 Egypt 
In the initial phase, one of the results of my analysis is the effects of the regime 
breaking down the infrastructure during the stage of resistance. Since this was like 
in Tunisia, a social movement who tried to mobilize through online activism it 
was crucial that there was access to social networks. The result that my analysis 
makes here is that this could be why feminist NGOs and women had such a hard 
time to work sufficiently together. It marks one of the larger differences with 
Tunisia, where gendered agency got intertwined so early in the process. Another 
result from this phase is the fact that there might be an inability or simply 
unwillingness among Egypt’s women to socially mobilize as women. The 
interview with Esraa Abdel Fattah that I analyzed shows signs leaning towards 
such a result. If this is because women were scared, or have accepted hegemonic 
gender norms isn’t revealed in my analysis. It could be a combination of both and 
needs to be looked into further. In the emerging phase, I have presented reports 
saying that the regime specifically searched and arrested female protesters for 
extreme human rights abuses, referred to as “virginity checks”. What effects this 
had for gender agency and the democratization in Egypt is also something that 
needs more research. Egypt’s CA also made sure to strip women, children and 
ethnic minorities from important judicial protection. This clearly shows how 
different women were treated within the legal system, whilst in Tunisia a gender 
parity law was introduced. The result from my analysis in the final phase also 
shows that Egypt need to begin with restoring women’s rights that were actually 
institutionalized before the Arab spring. 
6.3 Conclusions 
I want to start by following up the purpose. The purpose of this Bachelor thesis 
was to explore the bigger phenomenon, why some post revolution states make the 
transition to democracy better than others. So, is there a general causality between 
gendered agency and democratization? I cannot claim any absolute or general 
cause leading to effect between my two variables. That was neither my intention 
  23 
like I said when presenting the methods and data for this paper. I do however 
stand by that my theoretical framework and analysis show that my independent 
variable seems to have large effect on why there is a variation of outcomes in my 
dependent one. What I have been able to do, is in a systematical way show that in 
these two chosen cases, we can see that the stronger the gendered agency became 
in Tunisia, so did their democratic transition process. I have also argued for the 
interconnection with a backlash in democracy, also leads to a backlash in 
women’s empowerment, like in Egypt. I believe I can safely argue that variables 
are at least mutually beneficial processes. Strong presence of gendered agency 
also promotes democratic values. I don’t think that any research in the nearest 
future will be able to substantially prove the opposite. In that case it needs to be 
established that: more gender equality – equals a weaker consolidation of 
democracy.  
 
My research question was: why did the transition become strong in Tunisia, and 
weak in Egypt?  What is fascinating is that the gendered agency got so intertwined 
with the revolution in Tunisia, being able to stabilize itself and the country’s 
democratization. But why didn’t it happen in Egypt? It cannot only be blamed on 
patriarchal structures and intersectional power relations, although these have had a 
very large impact and they are this papers standing as a main explanation. I am 
though well aware that Tunisia did have more beneficial prerequisites for building 
a strong foundation for both processes to escalate and become successful. I 
mentioned this before starting my analysis. The enormous complexity, and the 
dimension of both political- as well as religious aspects of Islam, is also not 
manifested in the Tunisian context like it is in Egypt, which my results clearly 
shows. The resources for reaching success in both democratization and promotion 
for gender prospects were also highly different. One aspect where both Tunisia 
and Egypt shared the same option though was to keep confidence for democratic 
institutions in times of backlashes. Tunisia did this by announcing a re-election 
after threats of renewed conflict. Egypt did instead consistently use its military 
and their oppressive methods, which makes it seem that they prefer going back to 
authoritarian principles in order to stabilize and await some kind of democratic 
ripeness. The danger with this is that a “temporary” totalitarian rule, waiting for 
the precise moment to give the power back, may just become a permanent one. 
People trying to grab power for renewed authoritarian principles to reach an end 
of violence, need to understand that this is no longer an option. ”However difficult 
a transition to democracy may be, it is the only path to long-term stability” 
(Tucker, 2012, p. 8). The answer to my question is that Tunisia probably 
understood his quite early, as Egypt has not. 
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